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Abstract
We use administrative tax data from audits of self-assessment tax returns to under-
stand what types individuals are most likely to be non-compliant. Non-compliance is
common, with one-third of taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of ag-
gregate under-reporting is done by just 2% of taxpayers. Third party reporting reduces
non-compliance, while working in a cash-prevalent industry increases it. However, compli-
ance also varies significantly with individual characteristics: non-compliance is higher for
men and younger people. These results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding
taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources.
I Introduction
A large share of tax owed goes uncollected. In the UK, around 6% of tax liabilities go uncollected
each year (HM Revenue and Customs, 2019), similar in scale to the value of corporation tax
receipts. In the US this number is 16.4% (Internal Revenue Service, 2019); in Canada 11.6%
(Canada Revenue Agency, 2019). This issue has become politically important, with strong
public support for reducing both avoidance and evasion (Tax Justice UK, 2020). It has also
captured increasing academic attention, with work on ‘missing income’ and ‘missing wealth’
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(Zucman, 2015; Alstadsæter et al., 2018, 2019; Guyton et al., 2020). A key input for this
research is a clear measure of where in the income distribution under-reporting is taking place,
and how much income is under-reported (by income source) across this distribution. This is
needed to accurately assign missing income and create corrected income distributions (Alvaredo
et al., 2016; Piketty et al., 2018).
In this paper we use data from random tax audits in the UK to study who is underreporting
income. We combine confidential administrative data on the universe of UK personal income tax
filers with a randomised audit programme. We show three main results. First, non-compliance
is relatively prevalent, though it is often small. One-third of tax filers under-report income
to some extent, but more than half the aggregate under-reporting is done by the 2% most
non-compliant taxpayers. This highlights the potential for policies like auditing to tackle the
most extreme non-compliance. Second, the probability of non-compliance is relatively stable
at around one-third across the income distribution. However, the share of tax that is under-
reported declines across the distribution. Finally, individual characteristics including age and
sex offer predictive power in estimating non-compliance. This is important for assigning missing
incomes, particularly when estimated income distributions are then used to look at relative
incomes of different groups, such as men and women (Garbinti et al., 2018; Burkhauser et al.,
2020). It is also important for policy, since these can be used to target compliance resources
such as audits.
Studies of tax enforcement sometimes compare the two main mechanisms observed from tax
authorities: sending letters and conducting audits (Pomeranz and Vila-Belda, 2019; Slemrod,
2019; De Neve et al., 2020). Our results speak to why these approaches are not really com-
parable: they are attempting to solve different problems. ‘Low-level’ non-compliance is very
prevalent, highlighting the need for scaleable mass-market interventions like letters (Slemrod
et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; Mascagni et al., 2017; Bergolo et al., 2020). But extreme
non-compliance is highly concentrated, with most of the revenue loss coming from a small frac-
tion of taxpayers, so more costly interventions such as audits can be targeted here (DeBacker
et al., 2018; Advani et al., 2019; Hebous et al., 2019; Sarin and Summers, 2019). The two
approaches are complementary, aimed at different types of non-compliance. Given the cost of
audit interventions, our results on what characteristics best predict non-compliance and help
target audits are also particularly valuable.
In trying to understand heterogeneity in tax compliance behaviour, a large literature has
grown up around the idea of non-financial motivations to pay, sometimes called tax morale
(Andreoni et al., 1998; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Dwenger et al., 2016). Early work used
surveys to understand reported opinions about tax, such as the extent to which tax evasion
can be justified, and correlated these with individual characteristics (Alm and Torgler, 2006;
Torgler, 2006; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010; Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2013). More recently
lab experiments have been used to relate observed lab compliance with individual characteristics
(Cummings et al., 2009; Choo et al., 2016; Guerra and Harrington, 2018). Our results allow
a mapping from individual characteristics to behaviour in real-world tax decisions (Alm et al.,
2
2015). We find qualitatively similar patterns to those on reported morale and lab compliance—
compliance is higher among women and increases with age. But we also show that some of the
variation in compliance behaviour comes from characteristics of individuals’ incomes: incomes
that are easier to hide are more likely to be under-reported, and these are more common among
men and the young. Evasion behaviour is thus the product of individual characteristics and
opportunities to evade.
Beyond tax administration, our results speak to a broad literature in public economics that
uses administrative data from tax authorities, rather than surveys, to understand patterns in
inequality. Survey data are known to have issues with coverage, and the gap between surveys
and national accounts has been rising over time (Atkinson et al., 2011; Ruiz and Woloszko,
2016; Burkhauser et al., 2018a,b; Webber et al., 2020). One reason is that income concepts
are sometimes different between national accounts and what surveys are measuring (Advani
et al., 2020; Corlett et al., 2020).1 But even after defining a consistent measure of income,
and weighting to account for non-response, there is substantial undercoverage. One proposed
solution to ensure consistency with national accounts has been to implicitly assume that by
income source, all individuals under-report incomes proportionally—the so-called Distributional
National Accounts (DINA) method (Alvaredo et al., 2016; Garbinti et al., 2018; Artola Blanco
and Mart́ınez-Toledano, 2019). Our results show that under-reporting is common among a large
set of UK taxpayers – one in three filers, one in ten taxpayers – but the majority do not appear
to under-report. There is also a very skewed distribution of under-reporting. Hence this under-
reporting needs to be corrected directly, before applying something like a DINA approach, and
audits are an effective tool in determining how to implement these corrections. This approach
complements other recent work focusing on adjustments to the income distribution to capture
evasion at the top (Guyton et al., 2020).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II provides some context about
the aggregate size of the UK tax gap, how it compares internationally, and the relative contri-
butions of different taxes to the gap. Section III outlines the policy context and data sources.
Section IV provides evidence on the distribution of non-compliance, both marginally and then
by incomes and characteristics. Section V concludes.
II UK tax gap
In the UK the tax gap is defined as ‘the difference between the amount of tax that should,
in theory, be paid to HMRC, and what is actually paid’ (HM Revenue and Customs, 2019).
Measuring what is actually paid is straightforward. Defining the theoretical liability is more
contentious. HMRC define it as ‘the tax that would be paid if all individuals and companies
complied with both the letter of the law and our interpretation of Parliament’s intention in
setting law.’ This clearly incorporates (illegal) evasion behaviours, and also incorporates some
1Another important reason is the rise in capital incomes, which tend to be less well-covered in surveys (Ooms,
2020) and are concentrated at the top (Advani and Summers, 2020b).
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avoidance where HMRC deem that to be ‘unlawful’, and this is the definition we will focus on.2
II.1 Aggregate
The aggregate tax gap in the UK was £35 billion for the 2017-18 tax year, or 5.6% of total
liabilities (HM Revenue and Customs, 2019). It has remained relatively stable, moving around
between 5.3% and 6.5%, for more than a decade. To put these numbers into context, the
five biggest taxes in the UK and (in parentheses) the share of revenue they raised in 2017-18
were: Income tax (25.8%), National insurance contributions (18.8%), Value added tax (17.9%),
Corporation tax (7.9%) and Council tax (4.6%) (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2019). So
the tax gap is equivalent in scale to between the fourth and fifth largest taxes in the UK. In
terms of spending it is close to the amount spent on defence or central government spending
on education.
Despite this, by international standards the UK tax gap is relatively low. The most recent
tax gap estimates for the US, covering 2011-13, found a gap of 16.4% of revenue owed, triple the
UK rate (Internal Revenue Service, 2016). In Canada, estimates for 2014 suggest the tax gap
was around twice that in the UK, between 10.6-12.6% (Canada Revenue Agency, 2019). Few
other countries produce comprehensive tax gap estimates, though some produce numbers for
particular tax sources (and particular years) only (OECD, 2019, Table A146). Again the UK
performs very well. So the need to understand how to reduce the tax gap, which is important
in the UK, is even more necessary in other contexts.
II.2 Structure
To reduce the tax gap, it is useful to think about which areas of tax have the largest gap.
Figure 1 shows the share of the tax gap that comes from various sources, and the share of
revenue due from that source that is not brought in (the ‘percentage gap’). Three features
stand out. First, personal taxes – Income Tax, National Insurance Contributions, and Capital
Gains Tax – and VAT make up around a third of the total tax gap each, at £12.9 billion and
£12.5 billion respectively (HM Revenue and Customs, 2019). In one sense this is not surprising,
since we have already seen that these are the biggest sources of tax revenue. More than half of
the remaining gap is from corporation tax.
Turning to the share of revenue due that is not received, this is actually lowest for personal
taxes, at only 3.9% (HM Revenue and Customs, 2019). By contrast VAT, which contributes
the same share of the aggregate gap, has more than twice the percentage gap: one pound in
every eleven (9.1%) is not paid. All other tax types fall somewhere in between. At first glance
this might suggest relatively little scope for focusing on individual evasion. While the aggregate
amount is large, it is only a small proportion of the revenue due from this source.
2It is worth noting that this definition excludes avoidance behaviours which HMRC interpret as being legal,
for example corporate structures that reduce UK tax liabilities. This has led to ‘alternative’ tax gap measures
being produced, which try to incorporate these and are consequently substantially larger.
4
Figure 1: Structure of the UK tax gap by tax
Notes: ‘Share of tax gap from source’ shows the share of the overall tax gap that is attributable to that tax.
‘Share of revenue not brought in’ is the share of all revenue due from that tax that is never collected. Personal
taxes comprise Income Tax, National Insurance Contributions and Capital Gains Tax. ‘Other taxes’ includes
indirect taxes (Aggregates Levy, Air Passenger Duty, Climate Change Levy, Customs Duty, Insurance Premium
Tax, Landfill Tax) and direct taxes (stamp duties, Inheritance Tax and Petroleum Revenue Tax). The share
of the total gap from self assessment and PAYE is less than the total gap from personal taxes because the
breakdown of personal taxes shown excludes avoidance (1.8%) and hidden economy (5.4%).
Source: HM Revenue and Customs (2019) Table 1.1.
However, within personal taxes there is substantial variation in the percentage tax gap, as
seen in the right-hand panel. Almost all tax due through Pay As You Earn (PAYE), the UK’s
withholding tax system, is received, with only a 1% percentage gap. By contrast, more than
one pound in six (17%) of all tax due through the self-assessment system is not collected. This
is by far the largest percentage gap for any tax ‘type’.3 It is also substantial in terms of its
contribution to the aggregate tax gap: £7.4 billion of self assessment tax was not paid in 2018,
more than one-fifth (21.2%) of the total gap (HM Revenue and Customs, 2019).
The key driver of this difference in percentage tax gap is that PAYE income is ‘third party
reported’ and also withheld at source (Kleven et al., 2011; Slemrod and Gillitzer, 2013; Adhikari
et al., 2020). Non-compliance therefore needs to be done by or in concert with one’s employer,
which is relatively difficult (Kleven et al., 2016; Bjørneby et al., 2018). By contrast self assess-
ment has more scope for non-compliance, since it is self-reported and (partially) self-remitted.
3The only tax component – a subcategory of tax ‘type’ – with a higher percentage tax gap is hand-rolling
tobacco duty, which is estimated to be 33%. In cash terms this is only worth £0.7 billion. It is also likely to be
over-estimated, depending on what share of hand-rolling tobacco paper is used for tobacco, and what share is
used for smoking other substances (Parey and Rasul, forthcoming).
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Trusts and estate .010
Share scheme .002
Other .030
Notes: The table shows the share of self assessment filers reporting non-zero values
for a given income source, averaging across tax years 1998/99 to 2008/09.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets. Repro-
duced from Advani et al. (2019)
As we will show below, the level of this non-compliance also varies substantially by income
source. To understand this better we next explain more about the structure of the UK income
tax self-assessment system, and what verification and enforcement mechanisms are available.
III The self-assessment system
III.1 Who files?
Around one in four income taxpayers in the UK file taxes through the income tax self-assessment
system (henceforth ‘self assessment’): around 10 million people.4 In contrast to the US, where
essentially all taxpayers are required to file, the UK has an effective withholding system (PAYE)
which is able to correctly collect tax for three-quarters of the taxpaying population. Individuals
who work in employment (rather than self-employment or partnerships), or who have pension
income, will typically have tax withheld at source. If any additional capital income (interest,
dividends) is sufficiently small that it falls below the tax-free allowances, then they have no
additional tax to pay. Self assessment therefore covers individuals who have income from self-
employment or partnerships, who have substantial income from dividends (more than £5000
in 2018) or interest (more than £500 or £1000 depending on income tax bracket), or who have
any income from property, since in all these cases correct withholding does not take place. It
also covers all individuals with employment income above £100,000 (£40,000 before 2006).
Individuals who are in self assessment are required to annually file a tax return report-
ing their income (and taxable capital gains). Data from these returns are captured and after
4There are around 40 million individuals with income ‘assessable for tax’. Not all will pay tax on their
income, as they may earn lower than the individual exempt amount (personal allowance). Nevertheless we
describe them as taxpayers for simplicity.
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processing are available via the HMRC Datalab in the Valid View dataset.5 Here we obtain in-
formation on individuals’ incomes and characteristics such as age, sex, region in which they live,
and industry (for those who are self-employed or partners). Table 1 shows share of taxpayers
with income from each source.
Filers are more likely to be male (70%) than the population at large (49%). The mean age
of filers is similar to that of the adult population, around 50 but filers are more concentrated in
terms of age—there are fewer young adults and fewer filers a long way past retirement. Filers
also have higher incomes than the average; although there are filers with lower incomes, they
are more likely to be self-employed or pensioners than employees.
We combine these with data from the SA302 dataset, which is produced from individuals’
tax calculations, and contains the tax due based on information about their incomes. We use
these data sources over the period 1997 to 2012, and uprate all financial values to 2012 using
the Consumer Price Index to account for inflation.
III.2 Verification and Enforcement
As described above, self assessment has proportionally by far the largest tax gap of any in-
come type. To understand this, it is helpful to think of four broad ways in which compliance
is achieved in the UK: (i) direct reporting, (ii) third party reporting, (iii) behavioural inter-
ventions, and (iv) audits. Understanding how each of these affects different parts of income
reported on self assessment will help explain some of the patterns we see in non-compliance.
Direct reporting makes use of systems such as ‘fiscal tills’, so that transactions are recorded
directly to the tax authority systems at the same point in time as they are recorded for the
individual or business (Slemrod and Gillitzer, 2013). The UK is currently rolling out a more
limited version of this – Making Tax Digital – which will send quarterly reports to the tax
authority based on the entries in an organisation’s accounts. This will apply to businesses, but
also self-employed people and landlords who have high enough receipts, and the programme is
explicitly intended to reduce the tax gap by improving accuracy and compliance (HM Revenue
and Customs, 2020). Although this is less direct than live reporting when transactions occur,
it is likely to have lower administrative costs for individuals than live reporting, and is more
applicable for cases where transactions don’t go through a till but are just direct transfers
into bank accounts e.g. rental payments. Individuals can still keep two sets of accounts, but
non-compliance becomes harder, and it becomes particularly difficult to be deliberately non-
compliant and later claim it was in error. Although this system can be expected to reduce
non-compliance among the self-employed and landlords, it was not at all in place during the
period of our data.
Third-party reporting makes use of reports from counterparties to transactions. This can
be done systematically, by automatic receipt of information and cross-checking with individual
5For historical reasons, after processing the data are available in either the ‘Valid View’ or the ‘Invalid View’
datasets. An individual in a given year can only be in one or other of these data. We always append these to
create a single dataset which we describe as Valid View.
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reports; or used in a non-systematic way, by contacting third parties only in cases where an
investigation is taking place. The UK does both of these things. Employers directly report
employment income to HMRC via the PAYE system, so HMRC can match this against self-
reports in self assessment.6 This reduces ex ante non-compliance since individuals are aware
they are highly likely to have misreporting uncovered (Kleven et al., 2011). It also reduces
ex post non-compliance, because mismatches on systematically reported items can increase the
likelihood a tax report is selected for audit. HMRC can also access bank and credit card records,
and non-systematic checking of these third party reports can be used to check the plausibility
of returns that are being audited, again reducing ex post non-compliance. As will be shown
below, variation in which income sources are covered by third party reporting is important in
understanding the variation in who is most likely to be non-compliant.
Behavioural interventions are designed to discourage misreporting. These are typically
relatively low cost, and are largely used to improve compliance before tax returns are filed.
For example, when filing electronically, the computer system can check box-by-box reports
against various benchmarks – previous returns, returns of similar individuals, ratio of reported
values across boxes – to see whether the declaration seems plausible. If not, the system asks
for confirmation. This helps pick up errors, as well deliberate evasion. Since it makes use of
benchmarks as well as third party reports, this can reduce non-compliance in areas where third
party reports are currently not available—most notably dividend and property income in the
UK. However, Fonseca and Grimshaw (2015) caution that interventions which pre-fill the form
with information held by the tax authority can reduce compliance in some circumstances, if the
pre-filled information is inaccurate.
Audits help to improve ex post compliance, by looking for erroneous tax returns and having
them corrected, as well as improving ex ante compliance through the threat of audit. They are
more costly than behavioural interventions, as they require time from a compliance officer to
handle each case.7 But they are able to look more directly at what is reported, and make use
of multiple information sources, to try to get an accurate picture of a taxpayer’s income. There
is also evidence they change taxpayer behaviour in the years after audit (DeBacker et al., 2018;
Advani et al., 2019).
Although most audits are targeted at taxpayers believed to be non-compliant, HMRC also
performs a number of random audits (‘random enquiries’) to ensure all individuals have some
chance of audit and to learn about characteristics that predict non-compliance. We make use
of audit records from these random enquiries for tax years 1999 to 2009, available from CQI
(Compliance Quality Initiative)—an operational database that records audits of income tax self
assessment returns. It includes operational information about the audits, such as start and end
dates, and audit outcomes: whether non-compliance was found, and the size of any correction,
6This is also done regularly with VAT in other countries, where both parties to the transaction have to report
it and these reports are matched up (Pomeranz, 2015; Naritomi, 2019; Almunia et al., 2019).
7Section SALF400 of the ‘HMRC internal manual’ (available online via gov.uk) explains the legal framework
under which ‘enquiries’ (as HMRC describe audits) take place. SALF404 specifically describes what is publically
known about the enquiry process, including what compliance offers do in an enquiry.
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penalties and interest. Over our sample period there were 38,000 random audits carried out,
just below 3,200 a year.8
IV Who is underpaying?
IV.1 Distribution of underpayment
Figure 2: Distribution of tax owed among the non-compliant
Notes: Left hand panel shows the share of self assessment filers found to be under-reporting tax who under-
reported by particular amounts. Right hand panel shows the share of all under-reported tax owed that is owed
by people under-reporting particular amounts.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
The first key fact to understand in terms of compliance in self assessment is that around
one-third (35.7%) of randomly audited individuals were found to be non-compliant. Most of
the remainder had correct returns (53.2% of all taxpayers), while around a tenth (11.1%) were
recorded ‘correct with no underpayment’—either the return had an error that didn’t affect tax
liability, such a valid deduction amount being claimed but filed under the wrong deduction
category, or in some cases errors that had led to over payment. Non-compliance is therefore
relatively prevalent in the UK self assessment system.
Despite the wide prevalence of some non-compliance, most of the under-reporting is due
to a small minority. Figure 2 shows – among the non-compliant – who owes money and how
much. Non-compliant taxpayers are divided into groups according to how much money the
audit suggests that they owe: less than £100, between £100 and £1,000, between £1,000 and
£10,000, or more than £10,000. 48% of taxpayers owe between £100 and £1,000, with a total
8See Advani et al. (2019) for more details about the audit data including number of cases selected for audit
and time trends.
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of 60% owing less than £1,000. However, this 60% owe only 9% of the total missing tax. In
contrast, 42% of the missing tax is owed by the 4% of people who owe more than £10,000.
This highlights the enforcement value of audits in pursuing the small minority of individuals
who owe extremely large sums of money. Just 200,000 people owe more than half of the self
assessment tax gap – £3.7billion – between them.
IV.2 Incomes of non-compliers
We next study the income characteristics of the non-compliance in terms of location in the
income distribution, income source, and industry.
Evasion across the income distribution To understand how tax compliance varies with
reported income, in Figure 3 we divide taxpayers up according to the level of total income they
declare the year before they are audited. Around 16% of taxpayers previously declared a zero
income, whilst the remaining taxpayers are divided into five equal groups. Across all these
groups, the probability of being non-compliant was relatively similar. The average amount of
non-compliance in cash terms was also similar, at around £2,200, for all but the highest income
group, for whom it was £3,600. However, since total tax owed is generally larger with higher
previous incomes, the share of tax misreported is lower for higher income groups.
Studies of inequality often make use of tax data to get measures of income (Piketty and
Saez, 2003; Piketty et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2019; Joyce et al., 2019; Advani and Summers,
2020a), and they are increasingly recognising the need to adjust measured inequality to account
for evasion (Alstadsæter et al., 2019). In the UK these results suggest that individual income
inequality is slightly less bad than would be suggested by unadjusted fiscal income, since pro-
portionally more income needs adding to the lower part of the distribution.9 However, it is
worth noting that evidence from the US suggests that some of the more complex types of tax
avoidance behaviours are harder to pick up, and so understatement at the very top may be a
larger issue (Guyton et al., 2020).
Evasion by income source Comparing individuals who have income from only one income
source other than bank interest gives an indication of how non-compliance varies by the type
of income.10 Figure 4 shows that 59% of taxpayers declaring only self-employment income
are found to be non-compliant, double the rate of non-compliance among those declaring only
employment income (29%) and almost four times the rate among those declaring only pension
income (16%). This is not surprising since – as described previously – self-employment income
9Note that since the self assessment income tax population contains proportionally more high income in-
dividuals than the population as a whole (though it does also have low income individuals), the percentage
increases shown here cannot be directly applied to quintiles of the population income distribution.
10Advani et al. (2019) study differences in dynamic response across income sources within individual. They
highlight the importance of source volatility in the dynamic response across income sources. A similar compar-
ison cannot be done here for non-compliance by source within individual, since audit data don’t explain which
source(s) was/were erroneous where multiple sources exist.
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Figure 3: Non-compliance by reported income quintile
Notes: Audited taxpayers grouped into zero income or income quintiles conditional on positive reported income,
based on income report the year before audit. Note that income quintiles are defined in the population of self
assessment income tax filers, which contains more high income and fewer low income individuals than the UK
as a whole.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
is almost entirely self-reported, and income is often received from a large number of small
transactions, making it is easier both to make mistakes and to obscure deliberately.
More surprising is that non-compliance is so high for those reporting only employment
income, even though such income is also reported by the employer. This may be because some
other source of income (employment or otherwise) was entirely unreported, or due to incorrectly
claiming illegitimate some relief or deduction – which are not third party reported – rather than
because of errors in reporting the employment income. In some cases employment income will
be incorrectly reported, but as noted above the tax gap for PAYE income is around 1% so this
is likely to be rare.11 However, it highlights the importance of audits even in cases where non-
compliance seems more unlikely: almost a third of people filing self assessment and reporting
only employment income still have some error.
In terms of revenue, the largest amount of tax is owed by non-compliant taxpayers declaring
only property income. Although only 24% of those declaring only property income are found
to be non-compliant, they owe an average of £3,630. This is almost 60% of the total tax they
owe.
11Non-compliance for employment income is low both because it is reported by the employer, and because it
is withheld and remitted by the employer (Slemrod, 2008). Withholding has been shown to be important in a
variety of empirical settings (Brockmeyer and Hernandez, 2018; Pessina, 2020; Waseem, forthcoming).
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Figure 4: Non-compliance by income source
Notes: Left hand panel shows the share of self assessment filers found to be under-reporting tax by income
source. Right hand panel shows the additional revenue owed as a share of all tax owed (including the under-
report), by income source. Based on self assessment filers who report only a single income source (other than
bank interest), since audit data don’t explain which source(s) was/were erroneous where multiple sources exist.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
To compare these results to Kleven et al. (2011), they find 14.9% of self-employment income
is underreported but only 2.3% of dividend income and 1.1% of employment income, not con-
ditioning on compliance status. The comparable numbers from our context are 26.1%, 5.2%,
and 3.5%. Underreporting therefore seems to be a greater problem in the UK context than
in Denmark, whether third party information is available or not. Similar results apply when
looking at non-compliance status.
Together these results emphasise an understudied aspect of third party reporting: the extent
to which it matters for the extensive margin (declaring at all) versus the intensive margin
(correct declarations conditional on reporting). Figure 4 orders income sources from lowest to
highest extent of third party reporting in the UK.12 The right-hand panel shows clearly that
third party information is important for the intensive margin, as it makes mismatches in reports
easier to pick up. However, it appears to matter much less on the extensive margin, shown in
the left-hand panel.
Evasion by industry Industry data are available for taxpayers who have any self-employment
income. Figure 5 shows that among those individuals – 43% of all self assessment taxpayers –
non-compliance is highest among those in the construction, transport, and hospitality sectors.
12See Table A2 of Advani et al. (2019) for more details on the level of third party reporting by income source
in the UK. This ranks from employment income, which is paid by PAYE and fully third party reported; to
pensions income, which is partially reported by the pension provider; to property income, for which there is no
third party reporting.
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Figure 5: Non-compliance by industry
Notes: Industry classification based on aggregations of reported Trade Classification Number (TCN), among
individuals with employment, self-employment, or partnership income. No industry is available for individuals
with only pension, dividend, property or savings income. Where multiple income sources with associated TCN
exist, the largest reported source is used.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
In these sectors, around 60% of taxpayers were non-compliant. In revenue terms, non-compliant
taxpayers in hospitality owe by far the most, at an average of almost £4,500. Across other in-
dustries, the amount owed varies between £2,500 and £3,200. Taxpayers in both hospitality
and transport under-reported the largest shares of the total tax they owed, at 54% in both
cases.
Again this underlines the importance of third party information: within self-employment
this is hardest to get for individuals working in industries where cash payment is common.
Construction, transport (taxi and minicab drivers) and hospitality (bed and breakfasts) are
all industries where cash is prevalent. This observable variation in where non-compliance is
common provides a means for the tax authority to target audits. However, this also highlights
the value in understanding how audit effects spillover between individuals, since in a stan-
dard Beckerian framework a large ‘campaign’ that increased the probability of audit among
taxpayers of a particular type would likely, over time, reduce non-compliance even among the
non-targeted. It is also worth noting that as cash use becomes generally less common, that
should be expected to reduce under-reporting.
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Figure 6: Non-compliance by sex
Notes: Comparison of compliance behaviour among self assessment filers between men and women.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
IV.3 Characteristics of non-compliers
While income characteristics change the opportunity for non-compliance, individuals may also
vary in their willingness to under-report for other reasons. The literature on tax morale –
the intrinsic disutility from misreporting – has studied how this varies across individuals with
different characteristics (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Besley et al., 2019). For the most part
this has relied on reported preferences about tax behaviour (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler,
2006; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010; Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2013) or lab experiments
that elicit willingness to misreport (Cummings et al., 2009; Choo et al., 2016; Guerra and
Harrington, 2018). The use of audits lets us instead understand how this varies in a real-world
environment.
Knowing how behaviour varies with these characteristics can also be useful for targeting
audits, since they are not easily manipulable, unlike characteristics of income. It is important
to recognise that there may be ethical constraints to varying audit probabilities based on some
these characteristics.
Compliance by sex Figure 6 shows that men are more likely to be non-compliant. 40%
of men are found to owe additional tax revenue, compared with only 27% of women. Non-
compliant men also owe more money (£2,470 on average) than non-compliant women (£1,790).
However, this difference is driven by differences in male and female incomes. The additional
amount owed is 32% of the total tax owed for both non-compliant men and non-compliant
women.
Much is made of gender pay gap statistics, including those making use of tax data. These
rely on tax data being an accurate measure of incomes, and previous research has noted that the
gender pay gap is smaller in tax data than in surveys (Britton et al., 2019). Given the prevalence
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Figure 7: Non-compliance by age
Notes: Comparison of compliance behaviour among self assessment filers by age. Individuals grouped into
those aged less than 40, between 40 and State Pension Age (SPA), and those above the SPA.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
of non-compliance and gender-disparity in compliance behaviour, these results indicate that the
administrative data underestimate the pay gap, driven by the differences in extensive margin
behaviour, and this could be part of the reason for the patterns previously observed.
Compliance by age Looking at non-compliance by age, Figure 7 shows that it is broadly
similar for those below state pension age (SPA), with around 40% of individuals found to be
non-compliant and, among these individuals, around a third of total tax being undeclared.
Among those above SPA, non-compliance is much lower, at 21%, and less than a quarter of
total tax due was undeclared among the non-compliant in this group. Part of this difference
is driven by differences in the types of income received: it is harder to detect both mistakes
and deliberate errors in declared self-employment income than in declared pension income.
However, even controlling for income sources non-compliance is declining with age.
Our results on sex and age are consistent with Kleven et al. (2011), who find that in Denmark
being older and being female are negatively associated with evasion. However, while they find
that only the result on sex is statistically significant, these differences are all significant in our
case.
Compliance by geography Looking across the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland stands
out as the region with the highest level of non-compliance. Figure 8 shows that 50% of self
assessment taxpayers from Northern Ireland were found to be non-compliant, compared with
between 35% and 39% across the rest of the UK. Northern Ireland is also unusual in having an
average of 42% of total tax being unreported among those who are non-compliant, compared
with 31% to 35% elsewhere. However, in cash terms, non-compliant taxpayers from London
owe the largest amount (£3,420), driven by higher incomes in the capital. Within England
15
Figure 8: Non-compliance by region
Notes: Comparison of compliance behaviour among self assessment filers by region of residence within the UK.
Regions defined by Government Office Region codes, with English regions apart from London being aggregated
into a single group.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
excluding London, there is little difference across regions. In contrast to Kleven et al. (2011),
being located in the capital city is not associated with lower evasion. These differences are all
statistically significant, and hold when other characteristics are controlled for.
With our data we are not able to study further why this regional variation exists. However,
if access were ever made to regional information about audits, it would be interesting to study
how regional enforcement policy related to regional levels of non-compliance. This question
is of particular policy relevance at the moment, as in recent years smaller HMRC compliance
offices have been (and are being) closed and replaced with a small number of regional hubs.
This policy will create further geographic variation in the cost of engaging in audit work –
which can involve site visits – likely increasing the variation in compliance behaviour.
The role of tax preparers Around 60% of taxpayers have a tax agent (accountants or other
tax preparers). Of these, about 40% are found to be non-compliant, compared with just 29% of
those without. Among these non-compliant taxpayers, the average additional tax owed by those
with agents is £2,740, around 35% of their total tax owed; for those without it is only £1,400,
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or 27% of what they owe. Clearly people who have agents are likely to have more complex
tax affairs than those without. This leaves more scope both for mistakes and for the use of
deductions, reliefs and other tax reduction methods. The comparison made here is therefore
not intended to imply any kind of causal relationship. However, these numbers show that the
use of agents, who have experience of preparing tax returns so can reduce mistakes, certainly
does not solve the problem of non-compliance. Continued targeting of such taxpayers for audit
is valuable.
V Conclusion
The UK tax gap is not large by international standards, but when compared with revenue from
other taxes it is sizeable: it sits somewhere between corporation tax and council tax—the fourth
and fifth largest sources of tax revenue. The largest single gap – both in aggregate value and
as a share of tax owed – is from taxpayers who file self assessment. Using data from HMRC’s
‘random enquiry’ audit programme, we are able to shed light on who it is that owes this money:
what types of individuals. The patterns we describe are not intended to be interpreted causally,
since some of these characteristics are choices for the taxpayer. Nevertheless, the associations
are interesting to understand for four reasons.
First, measures of inequality – whether by age, sex, or income shares across the distribution
– often rely on tax data (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Piketty et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2019; Joyce
et al., 2019; Advani and Summers, 2020a). Differential non-compliance based on these different
characteristics will bias such measures, unless corrected for. Our results allow researchers to
sign the bias, and to make corrections by imputing the missing income according to these
characteristics. Given the importance of these statistics for both policy and public debate,
such corrections are essential to provide an accurate understanding of the levels and trends in
inequality.
Second, we generally want to understand the differences in individual behaviour. To the
extent that this varies with observables, and those observables can be related to preference
parameters such risk aversion, one can study how those parameters relate to observed compli-
ance behaviour in a real world setting. Lab settings typically let one elicit these preferences
simultaneously with behaviours, but given the importance of framing effects it isn’t clear that
responses to tax experiments in a lab overlap well with real behaviour. For example, Advani
et al. (2019) note that although a number of lab experiments find evidence of so-called ‘bomb
crater’ effects in compliance (Maciejovsky et al., 2007; Kastlunger et al., 2009), with individuals
being less compliant immediately after audit, such behaviours are not seen in administrative
tax data—in fact the opposite is observed.
Third, these results underscore the value of having third party information in reducing
non-compliance (Kleven et al., 2011). The UK does not have systematic asset registers, so
unlike many other countries shares and property income cannot be systematically verified. This
increases the scope for non-compliance. A policy move towards increasing access to information
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for the tax authority would reduce non-compliance in a broad way without having the high
marginal costs of an audit.
Finally, our results are relevant for the current targeting of audits, though of course directly
using them for targeting is subject to the Lucas critique. They highlight the value of using
observable characteristics, even ones that do not directly relate to tax owed, in targeting com-
pliance work. This naturally leads to important ethical and legal questions: is it reasonable
to use information about sex in determining who to audit. Administrative datasets on tax
do not include ethnicity information, but this seems a clear context in which people may feel
uncomfortable about such targeting, if it were to be relevant. These are trade-offs that must be
confronted in making policy. The alternative is not obviously less harmful: many people who
are unlikely to be non-compliant receive tax audits – costly for the individual audited as well as
for the taxpayer – because data that are informative about their likelihood of non-compliance
was not used. In this sense we fit into a new and growing literature on using characteristics to
predict legal outcomes (Skeem and Lowenkamp, 2016; Fagan and Ash, 2017; Amaranto et al.,
2018).
To make further progress on policy implications, more needs to be understood about how
taxpayers learn and respond to audit risk. Advani et al. (2019) and DeBacker et al. (2018)
show that audits shift the behaviour of taxpayers who receive audits. But a simple Allingham-
Sandmo model of rational non-compliance would imply that as the risk of being audited rises
for particular groups, compliance by that group should increase even among the non-audited
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1987). For policy this is a positive effect, since non-
compliance reduces faster in audit probabilities than if behaviour were static. Quantifying this
behaviour is a natural next step in thinking about the number, as well as targeting, of audits.
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